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INTRODUCTION 
Anna Offit, a law professor and legal anthropologist, has published Race-
Conscious Jury Selection,1 a qualitative study of prosecutors’ views of jury 
selection, which makes an important contribution to the literature on Batson v. 
Kentucky.2 By observing prosecutors during jury selection and by interviewing 
them about the ways in which they believe Batson affects their exercise of 
peremptory challenges, she paints a picture of prosecutors who are concerned 
about their professional reputation. These prosecutors worry that a Batson 
violation, or even a Batson challenge, will leave them branded as racists or 
sexists.  
Offit’s study of prosecutors’ views provides an intriguing piece of the 
Batson puzzle, and one that has not received much attention to date. As Offit 
notes, Batson has been studied in myriad ways—from court cases that involve 
Batson challenges to transcript analyses of voir dire to statistical studies and 
interviews with African-American prospective jurors who have been struck 
from juries by prosecutors exercising their peremptory challenges.3 Offit’s study 
adds to what we know about prosecutors’ views of Batson. She finds that the 
prosecutors in her study are concerned about their reputations and for the most 
part they want to do the right thing. 
Offit captures what prosecutors reveal about their experiences with Batson, 
but they might not always be reliable narrators. How can these prosecutors’ 
accounts be reconciled with the cases involving Batson challenges when it 
seems like any reason that a prosecutor gives will suffice and be accepted by the 
trial court judge as race- or gender-neutral? In these cases involving Batson 
challenges, prosecutors can give almost any reason, no matter how “silly” or 
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“fanciful,”4 just as long as it is race-neutral. Most recently, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has focused on cases in which it found Batson violations.5 In several 
cases, the Court has established that comparisons can be made between the 
reasons that prosecutors give for excluding black prospective jurors while 
accepting white prospective jurors who share those same characteristics.6 The 
prosecutors in these Supreme Court cases seem very different than the 
prosecutors that Offit interviewed.  
The prosecutors that Offit observed and interviewed seem painstakingly 
careful about trying to do the right thing. However, the prosecutors in the Batson 
cases heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, such as the state prosecutors in Foster 
v. Chatman and Flowers v. Mississippi, do not seem the least bit concerned 
about avoiding race-based peremptory challenges.7 Indeed, these prosecutors 
come as close as possible to creating smoking guns. The prosecutors’ office in 
Foster produced a list of black prospective jurors that the prosecutors did not 
want on the jury and that they removed with peremptory challenges. The 
prosecutor in Flowers tried the defendant six times, and each time he used 
peremptory challenges to strike numerous African-American prospective jurors 
and to seat almost all-white juries in this capital case. As the Court notes, the 
prosecutor in Flowers used peremptory challenges to strike 41 of the 42 African-
American prospective jurors in the six trials combined.8  
Although the prosecutors Offit observed in her study were scrupulous in 
their exercise of peremptory challenges, she suggests that some states’ recent 
revisions to the Batson test might be one way to make it more effective. For 
example, the State of Washington opted for an objective standard rather than the 
current need to show purposeful discrimination to succeed on a Batson 
challenge. An objective test might make it easier for prosecutors to know what 
they must avoid. I am grateful to Offit for having provided us this window into 
the prosecutorial perspective, but I am less sanguine than Offit that a state’s 
objective standard will do away with discriminatory peremptory challenges. The 
revised Batson test might help, but there are still ways to elude it. Time will tell 
whether the states’ efforts will suffice or whether Justice Marshall will be 
proven right. In his concurrence in Batson, Justice Marshall presciently 
suggested that the only way to eliminate discriminatory peremptory challenges 
is to eliminate all peremptory challenges.9 
 
 4 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam). 
 5 See, e.g., Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S.Ct. 2228 (2019); Foster v. Chatman, 136 S.Ct. 
1737 (2016). 
 6 See, e.g., Flowers, 139 S.Ct. at 2248-49; Foster, 136 S.Ct. at 1750–52. 
 7 Foster, 136 S.Ct. at 1744 (noting that prosecutors created a list of “definite NO’s,” 
which included the five African-American prospective jurors who remained on the venire); 
Flowers, 139 S.Ct. at 2245–46. 
 8 Flowers, 139 S.Ct. at 2235. 
 9 Batson, 476 U.S. at 102, 108 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[O]nly by banning 
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This commentary on Offit’s article proceeds in three Parts. Part I identifies 
the contributions that Offit’s qualitative study makes to what we know about 
how prosecutors perceive their role in light of Batson. Part II notes what is 
missing from this account. Part III considers how best to proceed in the future; 
the answer depends on how bleak one finds the past and the present. 
I. CONTRIBUTIONS OF OFFIT’S STUDY 
Offit’s qualitative study of prosecutors makes an important contribution to 
the literature on Batson. In her five-year (2013–2017) study of federal 
prosecutors, Offit observes them in 26 federal jury selection proceedings and 
interviews 133 Assistant U.S. Attorneys about their work. She is like a “fly on 
the wall” and from this unique vantage point, she paints a picture of how this 
group of Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the Criminal and Civil Divisions of a U.S. 
Attorney’s Office does its work. This is an impressive accomplishment and adds 
enormously to what we know about how Batson affects a group of prosecutors 
and their conception of their role during jury selection. 
Offit draws from her observations and interviews and highlights 
prosecutors’ comments that reveal their main concerns. They view a Batson 
challenge as a taint on their professional reputation.10 They want to avoid Batson 
challenges and will err in the direction of extreme caution. Even when they feel 
that there are legitimate reasons to remove some prospective jurors, they often 
decline to do so, out of fear that these prospective jurors’ race or gender could 
lead the opposing attorney to raise a Batson challenge. Some prosecutors 
declined to exercise any of their peremptory challenges so fearful were they of 
Batson challenges.11 
These prosecutors express concern that any Batson challenge could be a 
stain on their professional reputation and could even lead the jury to think of 
them as racists or sexists. They do not want to risk that label. Therefore, they 
think carefully about how they exercise their peremptory challenges. They 
refrain from exercising peremptory challenges that could lead to Batson 
challenges, and they even avoid raising Batson challenges when they think the 
opposing counsel has engaged in discriminatory peremptory challenges. 
These prosecutors also understand that they need to keep track of 
prospective jurors’ race, gender, and ethnicity, as well as their own non-
discriminatory reasons for exercising peremptory challenges, in case they have 
to explain their strike at step 2 of the Batson test (where the defense has 
established a prima facie case of discrimination at step 1 of the Batson test and 
so the prosecutor would have to give reasons for his or her peremptory challenge 
at step 2; at step 3 the trial judge decides whether those reasons are pretextual). 
Some of these prosecutors lament that they have to think about prospective 
jurors’ race, gender, and ethnicity as part of their trial strategy and write down 
 
 10 Offit, supra note 1, at 206, 229–30, 232, 235–36, 237. 
 11 Id. at 227, 229. 
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these characteristics during jury selection. These prosecutors thought that the 
goal of Batson was to have lawyers exercise peremptory challenges without 
taking account of a prospective juror’s race, gender, or ethnicity. Instead, they 
have to spend time during jury selection trying to ascertain prospective jurors’ 
race, gender, or ethnicity, and making a note of it in case they have to defend 
their peremptory challenge if the defense raises a Batson challenge. As one 
prosecutor explained: “‘[Batson is] supposed to prevent you from taking race 
into account . . . but in fact [Batson] makes you think of it more.’”12 
Although the dominant finding was that these prosecutors were concerned 
about Batson challenges because they want to maintain their professional 
reputation and because they want the jury to think well of them, they did not 
always act in accordance with Batson. For example, one female prosecutor held 
the view that “a young female juror might feel attracted to [the defendant].”13 
She continued to strike young female prospective jurors for this reason,14 even 
though Batson, as expanded by J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,15 does not permit 
strikes based on gender.16 Other prosecutors continued to ask questions that 
could be regarded as “proxies” for race.17 Although the current Batson test does 
not prohibit this, some states, such as Washington and California, have revised 
the Batson test to prohibit these proxies, which they have recognized as 
discriminatory.18 
Offit’s observations and interviews shine a light on this group of federal 
prosecutors and how they think about jury selection under Batson. These 
prosecutors describe their concerns about Batson challenges and explain that 
such challenges will harm their professional reputation and they go out of their 
way to avoid such stigma. These prosecutors also acknowledge that they engage 
in record-keeping during jury selection in which they note the race, gender, and 
ethnicity of prospective jurors, even though they think that the goal of Batson 
was to exercise peremptory challenges without consideration of such 
characteristics. They also make careful note of the nondiscriminatory reasons 
that motivate their exercise of peremptory challenges in case they need them for 
step 2 of Batson or for any appeals. The picture that Offit provides of these 
federal prosecutors and their concerns is one that adds to our knowledge of how 
one set of trial participants believes they have been affected by Batson.  
In sum, Offit’s study reveals a group of federal prosecutors who think 
carefully about the exercise of their peremptory challenges and who try hard to 
avoid Batson challenges in the twenty-six jury selection proceedings that Offit 
 
 12 Id. at 231 & n.246 (interviews with AM, Assistant U.S. Attorney (2013–17)). 
 13 Id. at 234. 
 14 Id.  
 15 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that gender-based peremptory challenges violate the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 16 Id. at 129. 
 17 Offit, supra note 1, at 234. 
 18 See infra notes 35–40 and accompanying text (including examples of presumptively 
invalid reasons). 
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observed. Indeed, there were only four Batson challenges in these twenty-six 
proceedings,19 and no Batson violations.20 Offit observed that the possibility of 
a Batson challenge was “a frequent source of anxiety for the attorneys in this 
study,” even though Batson challenges were “uncommon in practice.”21 It is 
good to discover prosecutors who take care when they exercise their peremptory 
challenges, but this is just one group. Not all prosecutors or lawyers are so 
careful or so anxious about avoiding Batson challenges. 
II. LIMITATIONS OF OFFIT’S STUDY 
There are many studies and cases involving Batson challenges that suggest 
that prosecutors and other lawyers do not show the same restraint and are not 
guided by the same concerns as the federal prosecutors in Offit’s study. 
Although Offit is right that these federal prosecutors’ perspectives are important 
to learn about, they are only one piece of the Batson landscape and it is important 
to understand the broader context to which Offit’s study contributes.  
First, as Offit acknowledges, there are limitations to her study. She mentions 
that her study is not random and is limited to one location. Although the number 
of jury proceedings (26) in Offit’s study is impressive, as is the number of 
interviews (133) she conducted over an extended period of time (5 years), there 
are other limitations. One is that this is a study of federal prosecutors in one U.S. 
Attorney’s Office. These prosecutors are an elite group with a strong sense of 
professionalism and esprit de corps. They also take seriously their status as 
officers of the court, and even though they undoubtedly want to win their cases, 
they also try to hold themselves to a high professional standard. So, one question 
is whether the views of this elite cadre of prosecutors are widely shared across 
the country by federal and state prosecutors alike.  
Second, although Offit saw her task as “learning about research subjects’ 
experiences and opinions by engaging in work alongside them,”22 it means that 
she was listening to what they told her, taking down their words as faithfully as 
possible, and organizing their comments according to the themes that she 
discerned. This method does not seem to include questioning what her sources 
told her. As a result, this group of prosecutors offers a very rose-colored view 
of their own behavior. It may be an accurate reflection of their behavior or it 
may be a view that should be taken with a grain of salt because it was not subject 
to questioning. If it is not the place of the interviewer to push her subjects and 
to question them, then perhaps one way of achieving more balance would be to 
interview defense attorneys and judges in the same location as the prosecutors. 
They are participants in the jury selection proceedings and they might be able 
 
 19 Offit, supra note 1, at 224, 226 n.186. 
 20 Id. at 224 n.166. 
 21 Id. at 226. 
 22 Id. at 224 n.165. 
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to shed some light on how accurate they thought the prosecutors’ descriptions 
of their practices were, at least in the courtroom. 
Third, although Offit explains that her approach is useful because it is in 
“real time”23 and offers a view of how prosecutors understand and put into effect 
Batson on a daily basis, other studies, which Offit describes as taking a 
“retrospective orientation” or “work[ing] backward” because they work from 
“strike patterns and seated-jury demographics,”24 merit more discussion in her 
Article because these studies provide a context in which to place Offit’s study. 
Batson was decided in 1986. There are thirty-five years of cases that involve 
Batson challenges, as well as myriad academic studies of Batson, many of which 
are critical of Batson and find Batson to be ineffective at constraining 
discriminatory peremptory challenges.25 These many studies take a variety of 
approaches, as Offit acknowledges.26 Some of them are statistical analyses that 
show that African-American prospective jurors are the subject of race-based 
peremptory challenges and no other factor could explain their exclusion.27 Other 
studies focus on transcript analyses to show that prosecutors question African-
American and white prospective jurors differently during voir dire so as to 
provide cover for their peremptory challenges based on race.28 Other studies 
focus on capital cases, where some of the most egregious instances of race-based 
peremptory challenges are found.29 Still other studies look at the case law of 
Batson challenges and show how hard it is to succeed with a Batson challenge.30 
Studies of the case law reveal how easy it is to give a race-neutral reason, how 
reluctant trial judges are to question that reason, and how deferential courts of 
appeals judges are to trial judges’ assessments because the latter are in the 
courtroom whereas the former have only the cold, hard record before them. 
Some studies have focused on a region of the country and have interviewed 
African-American prospective jurors who were excluded from the jury through 
 
 23 Id. at 205. 
 24 Id. at 222. 
 25 See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, Foster v. Chatman: A Missed Opportunity for Batson and 
the Peremptory Challenge, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1140 n.9 (2017) (providing a sampling 
of studies critical of Batson). 
 26 Offit, supra note 1, at 205. 
 27 See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Statistical Proof of Racial Discrimination in the Use 
of Peremptory Challenges: The Impact and Promise of the Miller-El Line of Cases as 
Reflected in the Experience of One Philadelphia Capital Case, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1425 (2012). 
 28 See, e.g., Barbara O’Brien, Catherine M. Grosso & Abijah P. Taylor, Examining 
Jurors: Applying Conversation Analysis to Voir Dire in Capital Cases, a First Look, 107 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 687 (2017). 
 29 See, e.g., Barbara O’Brien & Catherine M. Grosso, Beyond Batson’s Scrutiny: A 
Preliminary Look at Racial Disparities in Prosecutorial Peremptory Strikes Following the 
Passage of the North Carolina Racial Justice Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1623, 1628 (2013). 
 30 See, e.g., Marder, supra note 25, 1182–85; Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the 
Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1708–09 (2006) (collecting 
Batson appeals in the Seventh Circuit between 1986 and 2005, and showing how rare it was 
to succeed on appeal). 
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a peremptory challenge and were convinced that it was because of their race.31 
Such interviews captured the feelings of sadness and exclusion that these 
prospective jurors experienced. Although Offit’s study offers a bright spot in 
that she tells the story of federal prosecutors who try to exercise their 
peremptory challenges carefully and for the most part in conformity with 
Batson, this account stands in stark contrast to so many other studies and cases 
over thirty-five years. Although Offit alludes to this larger picture, she needs to 
provide far more context so that the reader understands that her study offers a 
depiction that has not been very prevalent. There is the need for further study to 
see whether other prosecutors—state and federal prosecutors throughout the 
country—engage in good behavior when they exercise peremptory challenges 
or whether Offit’s prosecutors are an anomaly.  
The backdrop of past cases and studies is necessary in order to know how 
to interpret new developments. For example, in several capital cases involving 
Batson challenges the Supreme Court has suggested two ways to proceed that 
give some hope to those who raise Batson challenges. One way is for those 
raising a Batson challenge to show that a black prospective juror was struck for 
one reason while a white prospective juror who shared that same reason was 
permitted to serve on the jury (“comparative strike analysis”).32 Another way is 
for those raising a Batson challenge to show that white prospective jurors are 
being questioned during voir dire in a different way than black prospective 
jurors (“comparative voir dire analysis”).33 Both of these comparative 
approaches are important because they provide some way for Batson challenges 
to succeed. Before these approaches were available, the prosecutor could simply 
give a reason—any reason at all—and as long as the reason was race-neutral the 
trial judge would accept it. It was exceedingly difficult to show purposeful 
discrimination. But now that comparisons between white and black prospective 
jurors are a viable route, there is finally a way to show that the prosecutor had 
treated prospective jurors of different races differently and had engaged in 
discriminatory peremptory challenges. The problem is that there are not always 
comparisons to be made. Those raising a Batson challenge have to hope that 
there is a white juror who was allowed to serve when a black juror with the same 
characteristics had been excluded. Although this comparative approach opened 
up an avenue for Batson challenges that had not existed before, the approach 
only works when there are comparisons to be made. 
Although Offit notes this comparative development and describes it in Part 
II of her Article, in Part III she mainly focuses on how it affects the prosecutors 
she observed and interviewed. They now have to look carefully to make sure 
that they are questioning black and white prospective jurors in the same way 
and for the same amount of time and that they are not excluding a black 
 
 31 See, e.g., EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY 
SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 28–34 (2010), http://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-
racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf [https://perma.cc/3K84-6NH8]. 
 32 Offit, supra note 1, at Part II.A. 
 33 Id. at Part II.B. 
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prospective juror who has the same characteristics as a white prospective juror 
who is allowed to serve on the jury. For Offit, this comparative approach is 
important because it adds complexity to the prosecutors’ day-to-day job. The 
prosecutors in her study now have to spend more time taking good notes and 
reviewing transcripts to make sure that their behavior does not make them 
vulnerable to any Batson challenges based on comparisons. While it is good to 
know that this comparative turn has led to prosecutors taking greater care with 
their peremptory challenges, the fact that they have to spend more time taking 
notes and reviewing them is not a downside. Rather, the comparisons should 
further constrain their behavior. Offit’s study suggests that this comparative 
approach is having the desired effect, even though the prosecutors mainly 
complain about it because they have to spend time keeping track of their 
questions and reasons. 
III. GOING FORWARD 
Batson studies and cases over the past thirty-five years provide important 
background for figuring out how best to reform Batson in the future. The main 
message that the case law and studies convey is that Batson has been ineffective. 
Lawyers still exercise discriminatory peremptory challenges and Batson has not 
stopped them. The Supreme Court has addressed the most extreme examples of 
race-based peremptory challenges, but it has been unwilling to reexamine the 
viability of Batson. In its most recent Batson cases, it has found that state 
prosecutors violated Batson, but that has not led the Court to abandon Batson. 
Nor has the Court expressed any willingness to consider eliminating peremptory 
challenges, though a number of Justices, judges, academics, and lawyers have 
urged that reform.34 
Some of the states have begun to revise the Batson test, and it might be that 
change will come about through efforts by the states. For example, the 
Washington State Supreme Court has adopted a rule, known as “GR37,”35 
which tries to create an objective Batson test. A lawyer raising a Batson 
challenge in state court in Washington does not have to show that the opposing 
lawyer exercised a peremptory challenge based on “purposeful discrimination,” 
but simply that he or she satisfied “an objective observer[’s]” view that race or 
ethnicity was a factor in the exercise of that peremptory challenge.36 Moreover, 
GR37 contains a list of reasons that will no longer be accepted for exercising a 
peremptory challenge even though they have been given by lawyers in the past 
and have been accepted by trial judges as nondiscriminatory. Under GR37, these 
prohibited reasons are now recognized as having been “associated with 
improper discrimination” and are “[p]resumptively [i]nvalid.”37 Thus, 
 
 34 See Marder, supra note 25, at 1194–97 (identifying state and federal judges who have 
recommended eliminating peremptory challenges). 
 35 WASH. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 37, Jury Selection (adopted effective Apr. 24, 2018). 
 36 WASH. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 37(e). 
 37 WASH. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 37(h). 
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prosecutors will no longer be able to excuse African-American prospective 
jurors because they “liv[e] in a high-crime neighborhood”; they or their family 
members have had contact with the criminal justice system, or they have failed 
“to make eye contact” or they have made too much eye contact (“staring”) 
during voir dire.38 This objective test will be used whether the side exercising 
the peremptory challenge acted based on explicit or implicit bias.39 Washington 
is not the only state to have addressed peremptory challenges and the Batson 
test. For example, the California legislature passed a statute that amended its 
Code of Civil Procedure by expanding the groups that are protected from 
discriminatory peremptory challenges, switching to an “objectively reasonable 
person” standard in determining whether a peremptory challenge is 
discriminatory, recognizing that bias could be implicit or explicit, and 
identifying a number of presumptively invalid reasons for a peremptory 
challenge, even though lawyers had used these reasons in the past and judges 
had accepted them.40 
Having the states revise the Batson test has several advantages. It allows for 
states to learn from each other. In that sense, the states can serve as 
“laborator[ies],” as Justice Louis D. Brandeis once suggested.41 It also means 
that there can be a groundswell of support for change at the state level, which 
might inspire change at the federal level, just as some states had taken the lead 
on finding race-based42 and gender-based peremptory challenges 
unconstitutional well before the Supreme Court made that determination.43 
On the downside, however, waiting for states to revise the Batson test is 
likely to be a long, drawn-out process and one that is likely to produce a 
patchwork quilt result. Some states might change the Batson test, while others 
might not, and those that change it might do so in different ways. Meanwhile, 
African-American prospective jurors will remain with little protection. They 
 
 38 WASH. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 37(h) & (i). 
 39 WASH. SUP. CT. GEN. R. 37(f). 
 40 AB 3070, Juries: peremptory challenges (Sept. 30, 2020) (amending CAL.  CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 231.7). 
 41 Justice Brandeis suggested this approach when he wrote: “[A] single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 42 See McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 961–62 (1983) (Stevens, J.) (respecting the 
denial of the petitions for writs of certiorari) (noting that while the issue of race-based 
peremptory challenges was important, he nonetheless recommended that the issue percolate 
because there were no conflicts among the federal circuits and only two states had held that 
the prosecutor’s use of discriminatory peremptories violated provisions of their state 
constitutions); Marder, supra note 30, at 1693-94 (explaining the strategic importance of the 
opinion in McCray). 
 43 See Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the 
Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1049–50 & nn.19–27 (1995) (identifying the extensive split 
among federal circuit and state courts on gender-based peremptory challenges before the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided the issue). 
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will continue to be the target of discriminatory peremptory challenges. In 
addition, lawyers are likely to find new ways to evade the states’ revised Batson 
test. Prosecutors could come up with new reasons that are not on the list of 
prohibited reasons. In addition, the Washington rule only protects against 
peremptory challenges exercised on the basis of race or ethnicity. It does not 
protect against peremptory challenges based on gender, which is also an 
impermissible basis for exercising a peremptory challenge according to the 
Supreme Court.44 
Although I am intrigued by the ways in which Washington and California 
revised the Batson test and I will watch how these new tests work in practice, I 
remain convinced that a more comprehensive, uniform, and robust solution is 
required. Thirty-five years of seeing Batson in practice has persuaded me that 
Justice Marshall was right when he concurred in Batson but wrote that 
discriminatory peremptory challenges would continue until all peremptory 
challenges were eliminated. If the Court is truly committed to nondiscrimination 
during jury selection, then it needs to eliminate peremptory challenges. 
Offit takes a more sanguine view than I do of how Batson is working, but 
she, too, is interested in the experiments in Washington and other states with the 
revised Batson test. Her qualitative study of a group of federal prosecutors 
showed her that Batson was working, at least among the group she studied. Her 
study suggests that at least these federal prosecutors are taking care when they 
exercise peremptory challenges and are not for the most part exercising them in 
a discriminatory manner. She concluded that these prosecutors were guided by 
their professional reputations and wanted to be seen in a good light by the jury. 
Thus, Batson was doing its job, at least for the prosecutors Offit studied. 
However, Offit also recognized that the studies and cases from the past thirty-
five years pointed in another direction, which was that Batson was unable to 
combat systemic racism and sexism. Although Offit describes the prosecutors 
in her study as taking their role seriously and trying to do the right thing with 
respect to Batson, she suggests that a middle ground might be the best way to 
proceed in the future. The middle ground she suggests is to watch what the states 
are doing and to see if their revision of the Batson test works to eliminate 
discriminatory peremptory challenges. She suggests that the objective test could 
help prosecutors because they would not have to worry as much about being 
labeled as racist or sexist, but it might make their job harder if it makes Batson 
challenges easier to bring and to win.  
CONCLUSION 
Offit’s qualitative study of federal prosecutors shows that they are careful 
about exercising peremptory challenges because they view Batson challenges as 
 
 44 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that gender-
based peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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a taint to their professional reputation. They err on the side of caution so that 
they can avoid Batson challenges and Batson violations. Unfortunately, not all 
prosecutors or lawyers share this group’s concerns or anxieties about avoiding 
Batson challenges. In the thirty-five years since Batson was decided there have 
been myriad cases and studies showing that Batson has been ineffective at 
stopping lawyers from exercising discriminatory peremptory challenges. 
In light of Batson’s ineffectiveness, there are different ways to proceed. 
Some states are now taking the lead and revising the Batson test so that it will 
be easier to succeed with a Batson challenge. Both Offit and I agree that this is 
a positive development and we will see how this experiment fares and whether 
other states will follow suit. Offit is more optimistic than I am, perhaps because 
she thinks the problem is less prevalent than I do. After all, her study showed 
federal prosecutors behaving as they should for the most part. I am more 
skeptical. Since lawyers found ways to elude Batson by quickly learning which 
reasons they could give and which reasons they had to avoid, I worry that they 
will soon find ways to circumvent any state’s objective Batson test. Thirty-five 
years of Batson cases and studies support Justice Marshall’s view that 
peremptory challenges need to be eliminated. My hope is that the states’ efforts 
to revise the Batson test will inspire the Supreme Court to reexamine Batson, to 
accept that it has been ineffective, and to follow Justice Marshall’s approach 
and eliminate peremptory challenges. 
